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LA w AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION. By Daniel 
A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 159. Cloth $34.95; paper, $13.95. 
During the 1980s, concerned scientists warned that global warm-
ing would cause irreparable environmental damage unless the world 
community took immediate and massive corrective action. 1 Despite 
such dire predictions, U.S. policy has reflected the views of other, 
more cautious experts.2 Recent administrations have refused to initi-
ate government action to prevent global warming until scientists de-
velop consistent conclusions through continued study of the problem. 
Advocates of this approach assert that while global warming might 
have severe environmental consequences, a hasty overreaction to the 
threat could have even higher costs to society.3 • 
In Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction, Professors 
Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey4 advocate a similar "wait and 
see" response to public choice theory, a scholarly movement with 
equally troubling implications. Public choice theory is "the applica-
tion of economics to political science."5 George Mason University's 
James M. Buchanan received the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics for 
his pioneering work in the area.6 Buchanan's Nobel Prize increased 
the awareness of public choice theory among legal scholars. Conse-
quently, since 1986, public choice scholarship has exploded within the 
legal community, 7 raising a host of questions about the efficacy of 
1. See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 1988, at Al [hereinafter Shabecoff, Global Warming]; Philip Shabecoff, The Heat Is On 
- Calculating the Cansequences of a Warmer Planet Earth, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1988, § 4, at 1. 
See generally MICHAEL OPPENHEIMER & ROBERT H. BOYLE, DEAD HEAT (1990) (providing an 
overview of the global warming problem). 
2. See Shabecoff, Global Warming. "SUpra note 1. Note that scientists still debate the expected 
magnitude of the greenhouse effect today. See Bob Davis, In Rio, They're Eyeing Greenhouse 
Two-Step, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1992, at Al ("[W]hether temperatures will rise that much and 
when are the subject of brawls at scientific conferences."). 
3. See Philip Shabecoff, Bush Asks Cautious Response to Threat of Global Warming, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1990, at Al; see also OPPENHEIMER & BOYLE, supra note 1, at 62. 
4. Professors Farber and Frickey both teach at the University of Minnesota Law School. 
Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction draws heavily on three previous collaborative 
articles by the authors. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and 
Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1013 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & 
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1987); Daniel A. 
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988). 
5. P. 7 (quoting DENNIS c. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 1 (1989)). 
6. Buchanan coauthored perhaps the seminal work in the field, JAMES M. BUCHANAN & 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CoNSENT (1962). See Robert D. Tollison, Public 
Choice and Legislation, 14 VA. L. REv. 339, 340-41 (1988). 
7. See, e.g. Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 14 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988). It is not 
surprising that legal scholars, especially those with a law and economics bent, have pursued 
public choice with a vengeance. In a recent article, Professor Robert Ellickson suggested that 
1512 
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American government. 8 
The book's subtitle - A Critical Introduction - accurately por-
trays what Farber and Frickey intend to accomplish. In a format ac-
cessible to readers unfamiliar with the intricacies of political economy, 
the book concisely introduces the two major strands of public choice 
theory. 9 At the same time, it critically assesses the theory and the 
applications of the theory to public law proposed by the existing schol-
arship. The authors reject the claim that the results of preliminary 
public choice research justify making dramatic shifts in government 
policy. Instead, they argue that if continued inquiry confirms the pre-
liminary :findings, public choice theory might, in time, lead to some 
promising applications {p. 6). 
I. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
As developed in Chapter One, the first and foremost tenet of public 
choice theory challenges the traditional assumption that government 
operates in the public interest. Instead, public choice theory views the 
policymaking process as a battlefield where legislators, bureaucrats, 
interest groups, and individual voters compete to maximize their own 
private interests. 
A common method of public choice analysis is to hold constant the 
behavior of three of these competing groups and then to consider the 
incentives influencing the remaining group's maneuvers. For example, 
some public choice scholars have focused on welfare maximization of 
legislators by holding the behavior of the other political actors con-
stant. Farber and Frickey recognize that politicians need to raise 
money and remain popular to keep their jobs and thus accept the pub-
lic choice argument that the pursuit of reelection exerts a strong influ-
ence on legislative decisionmaking {p. 24). 
A legislator may stay popular by providing two distinct services to 
her constituents (p. 22). First, she can tailor her voting behavior to 
the wishes of the majority of her constituents.10 Similarly, she can 
introduce legislation to protect and promote her constituents' general 
interests. Second, she can act as a liaison between individual constitu-
ents and federal agencies. She- or more correctly her staff-might, 
for example, intervene with the Social Security Administration to as-
sist a constituent in receiving his check. 
law and economics research has begun to reach a point of diminishing returns. Robert C. Ellick-
son, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and 
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 26 (1989). 
8. The authors might have put this recent history in perspective by including a brief discus-
sion of the historical development of public choice theory. Tollison, supra note 6, at 339-41, 
includes such a discussion. 
9. In fact, a reader with a strong background in political economy or in legal process might 
not find the book very useful. The authors did not address the book to this audience. 
10. More precisely, she can vote in a way that will maximize her expected number of votes. 
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Underlying this view of the behavior of legislators is the assump-
tion that constituents will perceive continuation of these services to be 
in their own economic interest and will rationally respond by voting 
accordingly. However, Farber and Frickey assert that actual voting 
behavior is not entirely consistent with tliis assumption and that voters 
do not always act rationally in their own self-interest. In fact, truly 
rational self-interested citizens would not vote at all because voting is 
costly and, according to the authors, produces no visible benefits (p. 
26). It poses a free-rider problem (p. 24), and, after all, no election is 
ever decided by a single vote. The authors propose instead that civic 
duty motivates citizens to vote (p. 27). 
Note, though, that two arguments support the view, dismissed by 
the authors, that voting is consistent with the rational self-interest 
model. First, as stated by Professor Dwight R. Lee, 
[P]eople receive satisfaction from participating in processes they feel are 
important, from supporting things they believe are good, and from op-
posing things they believe are bad. People are motivated to go to the 
polls and vote for much the same reason they are motivated to go to the 
sports arena and cheer. 11 
Second, even if one accepts the authors' view that ideology plays a role 
in voting (p. 27), one can argue that voting based on ideology is consis-
tent with public choice. As Professor Lee suggests, voting provides 
constituents with a cheap way to express their preferences.12 Voters 
will express their preference based on their knowledge about a candi-
date, which can be extremely limited. Consequently, they will vote for 
a candidate based on ideology and demeanor, which serve as readily 
discernible signals predicting how the candidate will act if elected. 
In addition to or in lieu of serving her constituents, our legislator 
may also maintain her popularity through political advertising and 
promotion. Such activities, and the political consultants engaged to 
coordinate them, do not come cheap. Thus, legislators feel compelled 
to raise a great deal of money and at the same time avoid negative 
publicity. Special interest groups can provide legislators with money 
and with publicity (both good and bad). Consequently, public choice 
scholars ascribe great power to these groups. 
Farber and Frickey do not subscribe to the dominant public choice 
view that the power of interest groups necessarily results in inefficient 
political outcomes out of sync with the public interest. Rather, they 
adopt a more cautious view that rent-seeking by interest groups poses 
a potential problem (pp. 33-37). Rent-seeking occurs when an interest 
group pursues an outcome which is economically beneficial to it but 
11. Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191, 
193 (1988). 
12. Id. at 194-95. 
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will result in a net cost to society as a whole. I3 A classic example of 
rent-seeking by special interest groups occurs when domestic produ-
cers seek trade protection from foreign goods. I4 Such protection is 
economically inefficient because the costs incurred by consumers and 
others as a result of the protection exceed the economic gains to the 
domestic producers. Is In addition, the costly rent-seeking behavior it-
self generally serves no useful function. I6 
Farber and Frickey question the public choice premise that rent-
seeking is necessarily undesirable because it is inefficient (p. 34). They 
argue that an economically efficient outcome is not necessarily socially 
desirable. For example, equity concerns might conflict with efficiency. 
Accordingly, the authors believe that "rent-seeking can be justified 
when it advances other social values."I7 
Farber and Frickey omit significant discussion of the public choice 
view of bureaucracy. Under this view, as advanced by George Stigler 
and others, bureaucrats build empires, maximize budgets, and take ac-
tions that protect their receipt of lucrative post-government employ-
ment. Is With the rise of the regulatory state, bureaucrats play an 
increasingly important role in developing and interpreting our public 
law. Consequently, even in the context of a concise introduction, Far-
ber and Frickey's failure to include some discussion of the relationship 
between public choice and the bureaucracy weakens their work. 
As we have seen, the first strand of public choice theory, the battle-
field model, suggests that political outcomes may reflect private rather 
than public interests. In Chapter Two, the authors develop a second 
strand of public choice theory known as Arrow's Theorem, which sug-
gests that political outcomes may not reflect dominant political prefer-
ences at all. Instead, political outcomes may be distorted by strategic 
behavior and the filtering of combinations of voter preferences through 
agenda-setting rules (pp. 38-40). As a result, outcomes may seem in-
13. Note that only some legislation is influenced by rent-seeking. If the cost of influence is 
greater than the perceived benefit, the interest group will not act. The degree to which rent-
seeking pervades the legislative process is unclear. The authors take the position that "in 
presuming that statutes are normally the result of self-serving influence, the rent-seeking model is 
too cynical about the legislative process." P. 68. 
14. ROBERT J. BARRO, MACROECONOMICS 530-31 (1984). 
15. Id. 
16. Special interest groups, however, may lower the cost to the legislator of gathering infor-
mation upon which to base their legislative decisions. The interest groups presumably have an 
incentive to tell legislators at least partial truths in order to avoid discrediting themselves and 
losing any chance of influencing future legislation. 
17. P. 35; see also Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoreti-
cal and ''Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 226 (1988). 
18. See, e.g .• DWIGHT R. LEE, FISCAL POLLUTION AND THE CASE FOR CoNGRESSIONAL 
TERM LIMITS 7 (Center for the Study of American Business Contemporary Issue Series No. 51, 
1992) (discussing role of bureaucracy in promoting the growth of government spending); George 
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971). 
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coherent. Farber and Frickey do a superb job of clearly communicat-
ing the intuition behind this complex material. 
Notwithstanding the incoherence that Arrow's Theorem predicts 
for a democracy, American government exhibits some degree of both 
coherence and stability. The authors conclude, therefore, that classic 
republicanism creates a countervailing influence on our political sys-
tem. They assert that, "[a]s compared with public choice, republican-
ism views the role of government as far more creative. Rather than 
mechanically processing preferences, government involves an intellec-
tual search for the morally correct answer" (p. 44). Farber and 
Frickey seem to believe that neither public choice theory nor classic 
republicanism offers a complete description of the political process. 
Nevertheless, they conclude that several features of the political sys-
tem's structure limit the incidence of the behavior predicted by Ar-
row's Theorem. For example, our strong two-party system facilitates 
preference accumulation through coalition building (p. 49). In addi-
tion, the separation of powers promotes stability. Ultimately, the au-
thors reject the Arrovian view of democracy as a black box intended to 
produce strict majority rule. In sum, they state, "a viable democracy 
requires that preferences be shaped by public discourse and processed 
by political institutions so that meaningful decisions can emerge. 
Given this richer understanding of democracy, Arrow's theory holds 
fewer terrors" (pp. 61-62). 
II. APPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC CHOICE 
The second part of Law and Public Choice applies public choice 
theory both to identify defects in the American political system and to 
develop solutions to them. In Chapters Three and Four, Farber and 
Frickey discuss and largely reject sweeping reform proposals sug-
gested by public choice scholars. Chapter Three responds to an argu-
ment made by Professor Richard Epstein and others that public choice 
theory provides persuasive justification for a return to active judicial 
review of federal and state economic regulation. Inherent in Epstein's 
argument is the public choice belief that government regulation cannot 
be presumed to further the public interest. Consequently, where a 
court can identify rent-seeking regulation, which by definition is eco-
nomically harmful, it should strike down the regulation in order to 
protect the public interest (p. 67). 
Farber and Frickey reject the revival of vigorous judicial review of 
economic regulation on three primary grounds. First, they find fault 
with the idea that rent-seeking behavior by interest groups is so perva-
sive and successful as to dictate political outcomes (p. 68). The au-
thors believe that (1) rent-seeking occurs only where the cost of 
influence is less than the benefit, and (2) the cost to the interest group 
of exerting countermajoritarian influence increases as the cost to the 
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legislator of ignoring voter preferences increases.19 Consequently, in 
many situations, voter preferences rather than interest group prefer-
ences (as advanced through rent-seeking behavior) will predominate. 
As an example, the authors cite recent deregulation of several major 
industries as inconsistent with a pure rent-seeking model. In each epi-
sode of deregulation, the interests of diffuse consumers in increased 
competition prevailed over the special interests of the regulatory mo-
nopolists (p. 68). 
A second problem is that this form of judicial review is potentially 
overbroad, reaching "legislation involving tariffs, defense contracts, 
public work projects, direct subsidies, [and] government loans" (p. 
68). It would require substantive review of virtually all regulation and 
force the judiciary to function as a superlegislature. "[I]f taken seri-
ously, [such review] would require much broader judicial review than 
even the Lochner Court ever contemplated" (p. 68). 
Finally, Farber and Frickey argue that facilitating economic effi-
ciency is not the only legitimate goal of government (p. 69). Govern-
ment may also promote societal values such as "environmentalism, 
racial equality, [and] redistribution of income" (p. 69). Consequently, 
the authors suggest that effectuating other public values may justify 
inefficient legislation produced by rent-seeking behavior. 
Chapter Four addresses the extent to which judges should rely on 
legislative history to interpret statutes. Traditionally, legislative his-
tory has been viewed as reflecting the intent of the enacting legislature. 
Public choice rejects the exis.tence of such coherent intent. Justice 
Scalia and Judge Easterbrook argue that legislative history should play 
a very limited role in statutory interpretation. In most cases, they be-
lieve the language of the statute alone should control its interpretation 
(p. 90). 
The authors concede that statutory language should often control, 
but they disagree with Scalia and Easterbrook's premise that courts 
should generally disregard legislative history (p. 102). They argue that 
sometimes one can divine a coherent legislative intent underlying a 
statute. In these instances, judges may find such intent useful in 
resolving statutory ambiguities. Farber and Frickey also reject the op-
posite extreme exemplified by judicial opinions that appear to treat 
committee reports (often prepared by youthful congressional staff 
members) as meriting the same weight of authority as the statutory 
language itself (pp. 98, 102). 
The remainder of the book describes Farber and Frickey's views 
19. The cost of ignoring voter preferences increases when the voters perceive legislation as 
important. For example, voters may have difficulty perceiving the importance of small changes 
in the tax code, and such changes are very susceptible to special interest group maneuvering. In 
contrast, a special interest group is less likely to prevail in areas where voter interest and under-
standing are high. 
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on the proper application of public choice to public law and identifies 
some modest reforms that could be implemented immediately. Find-
ing that "what we do know about the legislative process is that ideol-
ogy, economic interest, and legislative structures all play roles," but 
that "their relative importance is unclear and probably quite variable" 
(p. 116), Farber and Frickey are unwilling to embrace any theory 
which posits a consistently dominant role for any one of these ele-
ments. Instead, like many of the public choice theorists themselves,20 
they seek to employ the stabilizing aspects of public choice theory to 
facilitate the political system's ability to formulate responsive public 
policy (p. 117). 
The authors want courts to enforce "structural and procedural 
constraints on those aspects of the democratic process that public 
choice suggests are most vulnerable to malfunction" (p. 117). To 
achieve this goal, Chapter Five suggests first that Congress should re-
strict the power of special interest groups by limiting campaign ex-
penditures (p. 132) and strengthening political parties (p. 135). 
Second, courts should police delegation of legal authority to special 
interest groups (p. 136). 
Finally, when interpreting the meaning of a statute, courts should 
use public choice theory to assist in determining the proper scope of 
legislative intent (p. 142). For example, public choice could help iden-
tify the likely institutional influences present at the time a statute was 
enacted. In tum, this could enable the court to determine whether the 
legislature considered a particular issue at that time or failed to be-
cause the parties affected lacked representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Law and Public Choice presents a thoughtful introduction to pub-
lic choice theory. The reader will take away an understanding of most 
of public choice's major theoretical underpinnings. The second part of 
the book, in which the authors discuss how public law might incorpo-
rate the insights of public choice theory, is equally accessible. Public 
choice holds great promise for understanding and perfecting the polit-
20. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case 
for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179 (1988). Professors Brennan and Buchanan argue that 
critics have gone too far in criticizing public choice's results and that further academic inquiry 
should not focus on extreme results but rather on "the nonnative exercise of investigating the 
incentive structures embodied in various institutional forms." Id. at 180. Rather than embrac-
ing the view that economic motives dominate political actors, public choice theorists, according 
to Brennan and Buchanan, reject the view that "political agents can be satisfactorily modeled as 
motivated solely to promote the 'public interest,' somehow conceived." Id. at 181. For an exam-
ple of a critic who attacks public choice theory by setting up such a straw man, see Abner J. 
Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on The Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). 
May 1992] Law and Society 1519 
ical process; however, Farber and Frickey make perfectly clear that we 
have a great deal to learn before drastic action is warranted. 
- William Dubinsky 
